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Abstract
Several variants of the cops and robbers (CR) game have been studied in the past. In this paper we
examine a novel variant, which is played between two cops, each one independently trying to catch a “passive
robber”. We will call this the Selfish Cops and Passive Robber (SCPR) game. In short, SCPR is a stochastic
two-player, zero-sum game where the opponents are the two cop players. We study sequential and concurrent
versions of the SCPR game. For both cases we prove the existence of value and optimal strategies and present
algorithms for the computation of these.
1 Introduction
Several variants of the cops and robbers (CR) game have been studied in the past. In this paper we examine a
novel variant, which is played between two cops, each one independently trying to catch a “passive robber”. We
will call this the Selfish Cops and Passive Robber (SCPR) game. Here is a brief and informal description of the
game; a more detailed description will be provided in later sections.
1. The game is played on an undirected, finite, simple and connected graph.
2. The game is played by two cop players C1 and C2, each controlling a cop token (the tokens will also be
referred to as C1 and C2).
3. A robber token R is also used, which is controlled by Chance.
4. At every turn of the game the tokens are moved from vertex to vertex, along the edges of the graph.
5. The winner is the first player whose token lies at the same vertex as the robber token (i.e., the player who
“captures the robber”).
In short, SCPR is a game where the opponents are the two cop players. As far as we know this CR variant has
not been previously studied.
The study of Cops and Robbers was initiated by Quillot [21] and Nowakowski and Winkler [19]. For the graph
theoretic point of the view, the reader can consult the recent book [20] which contains a good overview of the
extensive literature. We will study SCPR from a somewhat different angle, using the theory of stochastic games1
as presented in, e.g., the book by Filar and Vrieze [13]. In the current paper we study qualitative SCPR games,
i.e., games in which the payoff is the winning probability; in a forthcoming paper we will discuss quantitative
SCPR games, i.e., games in which the payoff is the expected capture time.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary definitions and notation. In Section
3 we study the sequential version of the SCPR game and in Section 4 the concurrent version. In Section 5 we
discuss connections to several other research areas (for instance recursive games, graphical games and reachability
games) and in Section 6 we present concluding remarks and discuss future research directions.
1I.e., a sequence of normal-form games where the game played at any time depends probabilistically on the previous game played
and the actions of the agents in that game.
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2 Preliminaries
The SCPR game is played on an undirected, finite, simple and connected graph G = (V,E), where V is the
vertex set and E is the edge set. Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that the cop number2 of the graph is
c (G) = 1.
The game proceeds in turns numbered by t ∈ N0 and, as already mentioned, involves three tokens: C1, C2
and R. These will also be referred to as the first, second and third token, respectively, and their locations at
the end of the t-th turn are indicated by X1t , X
2
t , X
3
t . The starting position at the 0-th turn is given: for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, X i0 = x
i
0 ∈ V . In subsequent turns, the positions are changed according to the rules of the particular
variant (sequential or concurrent) and subject to the constraint that movement always follows the graph edges:
X it+1 ∈ N
[
X it
]
(the closed neighborhood of X it). As will be seen in the sequel, in the general case token moves
are governed by probabilistic strategies ; hence X1t , X
2
t , X
3
t are random variables.
2.1 Sequential SCPR
In the sequential version of SCPR players take turns in moving their tokens. More specifically, on odd-numbered
turns C1 is moved by the first cop player; on even-numbered turns first C2 is moved by the second cop player
and then R is moved by Chance. Consequently, for t = 2l + 1 we have X2t = X
2
t−1 and X
3
t = X
3
t−1; for t = 2l
we have X1t = X
1
t−1. An additional sequence of variables U0, U1, U2, U3, ... indicates the player to move in the
next turn; i.e., U0 = U2 = ... = 1, U1 = U3 = ... = 2. We also define the vector St =
(
X1t , X
2
t , X
3
t , Ut
)
.
A game position or state is a vector s =
(
x1, x2, x3, u
)
where x1, x2, x3 are the positions of the three tokens
and u indicates which cop is about to play. For instance, s = (2, 3, 5, 1) denotes the situation in which C1, C2,
R are located at vertices 2, 3, 5, respectively, and C1 will move in the next turn. We define the following sets of
states
∀i ∈ {1, 2} : Si = V × V × V × {i} .
In other words, S1 (resp. S2) is the set of states “belonging” to the first (resp. second) player. A C1-capture
state is an s =
(
x1, x2, x3, u
)
such that x1 = x3. A C2-capture state
3 is an s =
(
x1, x2, x3, u
)
such that x2 = x3
and x1 6= x3. We will also use a terminal state, denoted by τ ; the behavior of the terminal state will be described
in detail a little later. At any rate, the full state space of the sequential SCPR game is
S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {τ} .
The random variable Ait denotes the move (or action) of the i-th token at time t. When the game state
is s, the set of moves available to the i-th token is denoted by Ai (s). For instance, when s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
we have A1 (s) = N
[
x1
]
(the closed neigborhood of x1) and A2 (s) =
{
x2
}
. Similar things hold for states
s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 2
)
. For s = τ we have Ai (s) = {λ}, where λ is the null move. Legal moves result to “normal”
state transitions; e.g., suppose the current state is s = (2, 3, 5, 1) and the next moves are a1 = 3, a2 = 3, a3 = 5;
then, assuming 3 ∈ N [2], the next state is s′ = (3, 3, 5, 2). However, the terminal state τ raises the following
exceptions.
1. If the current state s is a Ci-capture state (i ∈ {1, 2}), then the next state is s
′ = τ , irrespective of the
token moves. In other words, a capture state always transits to the terminal state.
2. If the current state s is the terminal (i.e., s = τ), then the next state is s′ = τ irrespective of the token
moves. In other words, the terminal always transits to itself.
A play or infinite history of the SCPR game is an infinite sequence s0s1s2...sn... of game states. The set of
all infinite histories is denoted by
H∞ = {s0s1s2...st... : st ∈ S for t ∈ N0} .
A finite history is a sequence s0s1s2...sn of game states; the set of all histories of length n is denoted by
Hn = {s0s1s2...sn−1 : st ∈ S for t ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}} ;
2I.e., the minimum number of cops required to guarantee capture of the robber.
3C1 is slightly favored, since an (x, x, x, u) state is considered a C1 capture; however, because of symmetry, reversing the
definitions of Ci-captures would yield essentially the same results.
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the set of all finite histories is H = ∪∞n=0Hn.
We have already mentioned that each cop player moves his respective token. Rather than specifying each
move separately, we assume (as is usual in Game Theory) that before the game starts, each cop player selects a
strategy which controls all subsequent moves. Despite the fact that there is no robber player, we will assume that
robber movement is also controlled by a “strategy”, which has been fixed before the game starts and is known
to the cop players. Hence the i-th token (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is controlled by the strategy (conditional probability
function):
σi (a|s0s1...st) = Pr
(
Ait+1 = a|
(
X10 , X
2
0 , X
3
0 , U0
)
= s0, ...,
(
X1t , X
2
t , X
3
t , Ut
)
= st
)
.
The above definition is sufficiently general to describe every possible manner of move selection. We will only
consider strategies which assign zero probability to illegal moves. The following classes of strategies are of
particular interest.
1. A strategy σi is called stationary Markovian (or positional) iff σi (a|s0s1...st) = σi (a|st); i.e., the probability
of the next move depends only on the current state of the game.
2. A strategy σi is called oblivious iff it is stationary Markovian and σi
(
a|
(
y1, y2, y3, u
))
= σi
(
a|yi, u
)
; i.e.,
the probability of the next move of the token depends only on (i) the current location of the token and (ii)
the active player.
3. A strategy σi is called deterministic iff, for every s0s1...st ∈ H , σi (x|s0s1...st) ∈ {0, 1}; i.e., for every
history, the i-th token moves to its next location deterministically.
To simplify presentation, we will often use the following notation for deterministic strategies. We define
the deterministic strategy to be a function σi : H → V , defined as follows: for every finite history s0s1...st,
σi (s0s1...st) = a, where a is the unique vertex such that σi (a|s0s1...st) = 1. If σi is stationary Markovian, we
write σi (st) = a.
Suppose the game is in state s. Now C1 plays a
1, C2 plays a
2 and R’s move a3 is selected according to the
(fixed) strategy σ3; hence the game will move into some new state s
′ with a certain probability depending on
a1, a2 and σ3. We denote this probability by Pr (s
′|s, a1, a2)
4.
Payoff is defined as follows. In each turn of the game, C1 receives an immediate payoff equal to
q (s) =
{
1 iff s is a C1-capture state
0 otherwise
; (1)
C2 receives −q (s). Hence, a play s0s1.... results in (total) payoff
Q (s0s1....) =
∞∑
t=0
q (st) (2)
for C1 and −Q (s0s1....) for C2. Note that both players have an incentive to capture R.
1. If C1 captures the robber, he receives a total payoff of one (comprising of immediate payoff of one for the
capture turn and zero for all other turns); otherwise his total payoff is zero.
2. C2 never receives positive payoff (even if he captures the robber). However, we have assumed c (G) = 1
and this implies that a single cop can always catch the robber. Hence, if C2 does not capture R, C1 will
and thus C2 will receive a negative payoff; this provides the incentive for C2 to capture R.
Sequential SCPR is a stochastic zero sum game [13]. Each player will try to maximize his expected payoff.
Suppose the game starts at position s0, Ci moves according to strategy σi (for i ∈ {1, 2}) and R moves according
to a fixed and known stratey σ3. Every triple (σ1, σ2, σ3) induces a probability measure on H
∞, the set of all
infinite game histories. Hence the expected payoff to C1 is
J (σ1, σ2|s0) = E
(
∞∑
t=0
q (st) |
(
X10 , X
2
0 , X
3
0 , U0
)
= s0
)
(3)
4Note that in all subsequent notation, the dependence on the fixed and known σ3 is suppressed. Also, when a cop reaches the
vertex occupied by the robber we have a capture with probability one, irrespective of the robber’s move.
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and is well defined; −J (σ1, σ2|s0) is the expected payoff to C2. It is easily seen that
J (σ1, σ2|s0) = Pr (“C1 wins”|“the game starts at s0 and, for i ∈ {1, 2} , Ci uses σi”) .
We always have
sup
σ1
inf
σ2
J (σ1, σ2|s0) ≤ inf
σ2
sup
σ1
J (σ1, σ2|s0) ; (4)
if the two sides of (4) are equal, we define the value of the game (when started at s0) to be
v (s0) = sup
σ1
inf
σ2
J (σ1, σ2|s0) = inf
σ2
sup
σ1
J (σ1, σ2|s0) ; (5)
v will denote the vector of values for all starting states, i.e., v =(v (s))
s∈S. Given some ε ≥ 0, we say that:
1. a strategy σ#1 is ε-optimal (for C1) iff ∀s0 : v (s0)− infσ2 J
(
σ
#
1 , σ2|s0
)
≤ ε;
2. a strategy σ#2 is ε-optimal (for C2) iff ∀s0 : v (s0)− supσ1 J
(
σ1, σ
#
2 |s0
)
≥ −ε.
A 0-optimal strategy is also called simply optimal.
Finally, let Γ be a matrix game, i.e., a (one-turn) two-player, zero-sum game with finite action set Ai for the
i-th player and the payoff to the first player being Γ
(
a1, a2
)
when i-th player plays ai ∈ Ai (with i ∈ {1, 2}). As
is well known [22], such a game always has a value, which we will denote by Val
[
Γ
(
a1, a2
)]
.
2.2 Concurrent SCPR
Most of the CR literature studies sequential versions of the CR game. However, we have recently introduced a
concurrent version of the classic CR [15]. Now we extend concurrency to the SCPR game.
The concurrent SCPR game differs from the sequential game in a basic respect: in every turn the C1, C2, R
tokens are moved simultaneously (hence, when making his move, each player does not know the other player’s
move; note that both of them know R’s next move, since σ3 is known in advance). Once again we will assume,
unless otherwise indicated, that ĉ (G) = 1 (note that a graph G has concurrent cop number ĉ (G) = k iff it has
sequential, i.e., “classic”, cop number c (G) = k [15]).
In addition, in concurrent SCPR we can have “en-passant capture”, in which a cop and the robber start at
opposite ends of the same edge and move in opposite directions; in this case the robber is “swept” by the cop
and moved into the cop’s destination.
With concurrent movement, game states are vectors
(
x1, x2, x3
)
where xi ∈ V indicates (as previously) the
position of the i-th token; the u variable is no longer necessary, since all tokens are moved in every turn. Capture
states now have the form
(
x1, x2, x3
)
with either x1 = x3 or x2 = x3 (or both) and the definition and behavior
of the terminal state τ are the same as previously. For the state space, we define
Ŝa = V × V × V, Ŝ = Ŝa ∪ {τ}
and Ŝ is the full state space of the of concurrent SCPR game.
RegardingAi (s) (the actions available to the i-th player when the game state is s) we always haveAi
((
x1, x2, x3
))
∈
N
[
xi
]
. The definitions of (finite and infinite) histories and strategies are the same as in the sequential case,
except that we now use the state space Ŝ. The meaning of the sets Ĥn, Ĥ , Ĥ
∞ is analogous to that of Hn,
H , H∞. The strategies σi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are defined in the same manner as in the sequential case (again, for
deterministic moves we introduce the deterministic strategy functions σi).
Payoff of the concurrent SCPR game is defined in exactly the same manner as in the sequential case. Again,
concurrent SCPR is a stochastic zero sum game and each player will try to maximize his expected payoff.
3 Sequential SCPR
In this section we establish that sequential SCPR has a value which can be computed by value iteration.
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Theorem 3.1 Given some graph G = (V,E). For every s ∈ S1 ∪ S2, the sequential SCPR game starting at s
has a value v (s). The vector of values v =(v (s))
s∈S is the smallest (componentwise) solution of the following
optimality equations:
v (τ) = 0; (6)
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
∈ S1 : v (s) = max
a1
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr
(
s′|s, a1, x2
)
v (s′)
]
, (7)
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 2
)
∈ S2 : v (s) = min
a2
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr
(
s′|s, x1, a2
)
v (s′)
]
. (8)
Furthermore C2 has a deterministic stationary Markovian optimal strategy and, for every ε > 0, C1 has a
deterministic stationary Markovian ε-optimal strategy.
Proof. It is easily checked that, for every graph G and every starting position s, the sequential SCPR game is a
positive zero sum stochastic game. Hence (by [13, Theorem 4.4.1]) it possesses a value which (by [13, Theorem
4.4.3]) is the smallest componentwise solution to the following system of optimality equations :
v (τ) = 0; ∀s ∈ S1 ∪ S2 : v (s) = Val
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
v (s′)
]
. (9)
However, in each turn of the sequential SCPR game, one of the players has a single available action. For instance,
when the state is s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
, C2’s action set can only be a
2 = x2. Hence in (9) we are taking the value
of an one-shot game with the game matrix consisting of a single column. It follows that
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
: Val
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
v (s′)
]
= max
a1
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr
(
s′|s, a1, x2
)
v (s′)
]
which proves (7); (8) can be proved similarly.
The existence of stationary Markovian optimal strategy for C2 follows from [13, Corollary 4.4.2]. It is a
deterministic strategy because for each state s ∈ S2 the corresponding optimal C2 move is the one minimizing
(8). Similarly, the existence of a stationary Markovian ε-optimal strategy for C1 follows from [13, Problem
4.16]; the strategy is deterministic, because for each state s ∈ S1 the corresponding optimal C1 move is the one
maximizing (7).
For the computation of the solution to (7)-(8) we have the following.
Theorem 3.2 Given some graph G = (V,E). Define v(0) by
v(0) (τ) = 0; ∀s ∈ S1 ∪ S2 : v
(0) (s) = q (s)
and v(1),v(2), ... by the following recursion
v(i) (τ) = 0 (10)
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
∈ S1 : v
(i) (s) = max
a1
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr
(
s′|s, a1, x2
)
v(i−1) (s′)
]
, (11)
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 2
)
∈ S2 : v
(i) (s) = min
a2
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr
(
s′|s, x1, a2
)
v(i−1) (s′)
]
. (12)
Then, for every s ∈ S1∪S2, limi→∞ v
(i) (s) exists and equals v (s), the value of the sequential SCPR game played
on G, starting from s.
Proof. Obviously, for all s ∈ S, v (s) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence v is a (componentwise) finite vector. Then from [13,
Theorem 4.4.4] we know that, defining v(0) by
v(0) (τ) = 0; ∀s ∈ S1 ∪ S2 : v
(0) (s) = q (s)
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and v(1),v(2), ... by the recursion
v(i) (τ) = 0; ∀s ∈ S1 ∪ S2 : v
(i) (s) = Val
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr (s′|s, a1, a2) v
(i−1) (s′)
]
, (13)
we get limi→∞ v
(i) = v (the value vector of Theorem 3.1). The equivalence of (13) to (10)-(12) is established by
the argument used in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.3 The significance of Theorem 3.1 is the following. Since SCPR is a positive zero sum stochastic
game, it will certainly have a value, which satisfies the optimality equations (9); each equation of the system (9)
involves the value of a one-turn game. However, the optimality equations can be expressed in the simpler form
(7)-(8) which show that the values of the one-step games can be computed by simple max and min operations.
Remark 3.4 Similar remarks can be made about Theorem 3.2, where the iteration (10)-(12) is computationally
simpler (involves only max and min operations) than (13). Note the similarity of (10)-(12) to the algorithm of
[14] for determining the winner of a classic CR game. The similarity becomes stronger in the case of deterministic
σ3. In this case, Pr
(
s′|s, a1, x2
)
equals 1 for a single s′ = T
(
s, a1, x2
)
and Pr
(
s′|s, x1, a2
)
equals 1 for a single
s′ = T
(
s, x1, a2
)
; where T
(
s, a1, a2
)
is the transition function which yields the next state when, from s, C1
plays a1 and C2 plays a
2; there is also a suppressed dependence on the move of R, which is σ3 (s). Using this
notation, (10)-(12) simplify to
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
∈ S1 : v
(i) (s) = max
a1
[
q (s) + v(i−1)
(
T
(
s, a1, x2
))]
, (14)
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 2
)
∈ S2 : v
(i) (s) = min
a2
[
q (s) + v(i−1)
(
T
(
s, x1, a2
))]
; (15)
these parallel closely the algorithm of [14, p.2494].
Remark 3.5 Finally, note that Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 hold even when c (G) > 1; the reason for which we have
previously required c (G) = 1 has to do with the appropriateness of the payoff function introduced in Section 2.
In particular, when c (G) > 1 our argument about C2’s incentive to capture R does not hold necessarily (i.e.,
depending on σ3, C2 may ensure payoff of 0 without ever capturing R); Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 still hold true.
4 Concurrent SCPR
In this section we establish that concurrent SCPR has a value which can be computed by value iteration. We
first consider the case in which R is controlled by a general probability function σ3 (“random robber”) and then
examine in greater detail the case in which σ3 is oblivious deterministic (“oblivious deterministic robber”).
4.1 Random Robber
The two main results on concurrent SCPR are immediate consequences of the more general results of [13].
Theorem 4.1 Given some graph G = (V,E). For every s =
(
x1, x2, x3
)
∈ Ŝa, the concurrent SCPR game
starting at s has a value v (s). The vector of values v =(v (s))
s∈S is the smallest (componentwise) solution of
the following optimality equations
v (τ) = 0; ∀s ∈ Ŝa : v (s) = Val
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr (s′|s, a1, a2) v (s
′)
]
. (16)
Furthermore, C2 has a stationary Markovian optimal strategy and, for every ε > 0, C1 has a stationary Markovian
ε-optimal strategy.
Proof. For every graph G (and every starting position s) SCPR is a positive stochastic game. Hence (by
[13, Theorem 4.4.1]) it possesses a value which (by [13, Theorem 4.4.3]) satisfies the optimality equation (16).
Furthermore C2 has a stationary Markovian optimal strategy by [13, Corollary 4.4.2] and, for every ε > 0, C1
has a stationary Markovian ε-optimal strategy by [13, Problem 4.16].
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Theorem 4.2 Given some graph G = (V,E), let s =
(
x1, x2, x3
)
∈ Ŝa. Define v
(0) by
v(0) (τ) = 0; ∀s ∈ Ŝa : v
(0) (s) = q (s)
and v(1),v(2), ... by the following recursion
v(i) (τ) = 0; ∀s ∈ Ŝa : v
(i) (s) = Val
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr (s′|s, a1, a2) v
(i−1) (s′)
]
. (17)
Then, for every s ∈ Ŝa, limi→∞ v
(i) (s) exists and equals v (s), the value of the concurrent SCPR game played
on G, starting from s.
Proof. This follows immediately from [13, Theorem 4.4.4].
4.2 Oblivious Deterministic Robber
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are “simpler” than Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, in the sense that the former do not involve the
computation of matrix game values. We will now show that, when σ3 is oblivious deterministic, we can obtain a
similar simplification of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Before presenting these results in rigorous form, let us describe
them informally.
1. Suppose first that a game is played between a single cop and an oblivious deterministic robber. We will
prove that there exists a stationary Markovian deterministic cop strategy σ∗ by which the cop can capture
the robber in minimum time.
2. Next consider two cops and an oblivious deterministic robber. We will prove that the extension of σ∗ to
SCPR is optimal for both cops. More specifically, neither cop loses anything by using it; and one of the
two will capture the robber with probability one.
Let us now formalize the above ideas. We pick any graph G = (V,E) and any oblivious deterministic robber
strategy σ3 and keep these fixed for the remainder of the discussion. Further, let S denote the set of all functions
σ : V × V → V with the restriction that ∀
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V : σ
(
x1, x3
)
∈ N
[
x1
]
. In other words, S is the set of
legal stationary Markovian deterministic cop strategies for the “classic” CR game of one cop and one robber.
Now pick some σ ∈ S and play the game with starting positions X10 = x
1
0 ∈ V (for the cop) and X
3
0 = x
3
0 ∈ V
(for the robber). The following sequence (dependent on σ, x10, x
3
0) of cop and robber positions will be produced:
X10 = x
1
0, X
3
0 = x
3
0, X
1
1 = σ
(
x10, x
3
0
)
, X31 = σ3
(
x30
)
, ... ;
let Tσ
(
x10, x
3
0
)
be the capture time, i.e., the smallest t such that X1t = X
3
t , for the sequence produced by σ, x
1
0,
x30 (and σ3). Also define
V × V =
{(
x1, x3
)
: x1 ∈ V, x3 ∈ V, x1 6= x3
}
.
Then we have the following.
Lemma 4.3 Given a graph G = (V,E) and an oblivious deterministic robber strategy σ3. Let
∀x1 ∈ V : T (0)
(
x1, x1
)
= 0, ∀
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V : T (0)
(
x1, x3
)
=∞.
Now perform the following iteration for i = 1, 2, ... :
∀x1 ∈ V : T (i)
(
x1, x1
)
= 0; ∀
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V : T (i)
(
x1, x3
)
= min
x′∈N [x1]
[
1 + T (i−1)
(
x′, σ3
(
x3
))]
, (18)
∀x1 ∈ V : T (i)
(
x1, x1
)
= 0; ∀
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V : σ(i)
(
x1, x3
)
= arg min
x′∈N [x1]
[
1 + T (i−1)
(
x′, σ3
(
x3
))]
. (19)
Then the limits
lim
i→∞
σ(i)
(
x1, x3
)
, lim
i→∞
T (i)
(
x1, x3
)
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exist for all
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V . Furthermore, letting σ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= limi→∞ σ
(i)
(
x1, x3
)
and T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
=
minσ∈S Tσ
(
x1, x3
)
, we have
∀
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V : lim
i→∞
T (i)
(
x1, x3
)
= Tσ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
. (20)
Proof. The proof is based on a standard dynamic programming argument. First note that, for every
(
x1, x3
)
∈
V × V , T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
< |V |. This is true because C1 can reach any vertex of V in at most |V | − 1 moves; so C1
can simply go to X3|V | (the known location of R at time t = |V |) and wait for the robber there.
Next we prove by induction that
T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= n⇒
(
∀i ≥ n : T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= T (i)
(
x1, x3
))
. (21)
For n = 0, T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= 0 implies x1 = x3 and, from the algorithm, T ∗
(
x1, x1
)
= 0 = T (i)
(
x1, x1
)
for all i ∈ N0.
Now suppose that (21) holds for n = 1, 2, ..., k and consider the case n = k + 1, in which T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= k + 1 is
the smallest number of steps in which C1 can reach R. This also means that (i) there exists some x
′ ∈ N
[
x1
]
from which C1 can reach R (who now starts at σ3
(
x3
)
) in k steps and (ii) there does not exist any x′′ ∈ N
[
x1
]
from which C1 can reach R in m < k steps (because then C1 starting at x
1 could reach R in m + 1 < k + 1
steps). In other words
T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= k + 1⇒ T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= min
x′∈N [x1]
[
1 + T (k)
(
x′, σ3
(
x3
))]
= T (k+1)
(
x1, x3
)
.
It is also easy to check that:
∀m ∈ N0 : T
(m)
(
x1, x3
)
= m⇒
(
∀i > m : T (i)
(
x1, x3
)
= m
)
.
Hence the induction has been completed.
Given (21), we see immediately that
∀
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V, i ≥ |V | : T (i)
(
x1, x3
)
= T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
which implies that both limi→∞ T
(i)
(
x1, x3
)
= T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
and limi→∞ σ
(i)
(
x1, x3
)
exist. Taking the limit (as i
tends to ∞) in (18)-(19) we get the optimality equations
T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= min
x′∈N [x1]
[
1 + T ∗
(
x′, σ3
(
x3
))]
σ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= arg min
x′∈N [x1]
[
1 + T ∗
(
x′, σ3
(
x3
))]
hence, it is clear from the iteration (18)-(19) that Tσ∗
(
x1, x3
)
= T ∗
(
x1, x3
)
, for all
(
x1, x3
)
∈ V × V .
Now let us use σ∗ of Lemma 4.3 to define strategies σ∗i for Ci (i ∈ {1, 2}) as follows:
∀
(
x1, x2, x3
)
∈ Sa : σ
∗
1
(
x1, x2, x3
)
= σ∗
(
x1, x3
)
,
∀
(
x1, x2, x3
)
∈ Sa : σ
∗
2
(
x1, x2, x3
)
= σ∗
(
x2, x3
)
.
Then the following holds.
Theorem 4.4 Given some graph G = (V,E), suppose SCPR is played on G and the robber is controlled by an
oblivious deterministic strategy σ3. Then σ
∗
i is an optimal strategy for Ci (i ∈ {1, 2}), for every starting position
s =
(
x1, x2, x3
)
∈ Sa. Furthermore
∀s =
(
x1, x2, x3
)
∈ Sa :
Tσ∗
1
(
x1, x3
)
≤ Tσ∗
2
(
x2, x3
)
⇒ v (s) = 1
Tσ∗
1
(
x1, x3
)
> Tσ∗
2
(
x2, x3
)
⇒ v (s) = 0
.
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Proof. The key fact is this: when σ3 is oblivious deterministic, the players C1 and C2 interact only at the last
phase of the game, when R is captured. In effect each cop plays a “decoupled” classic CR game, in which σ∗ of
Lemma 4.3 guarantees capture in minimum time. Of course in the full SCPR game there is always the possibility
that the other cop can capture R at an earlier time. Hence the best Ci can do is to attempt to capture R at the
earliest possible time and an optimal strategy to this end is σ∗i ; he has no incentive to deviate from σ
∗
i (by using
another deterministic or probabilistic strategy) because this can never reduce his projected capture time. Hence
σ∗i is optimal for C1. Since σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2 and σ3 are deterministic, the outcome of the game is also deterministic. In
particular, when Tσ∗
1
(
x1, x3
)
≤ Tσ∗
2
(
x2, x3
)
, with probability 1 C1 reaches R before or at the same time as C2;
hence v (s) = 1; when Tσ∗
1
(
x1, x3
)
> Tσ∗
2
(
x2, x3
)
, C2 reaches R before C1 with probability 1; hence v (s) = 0.
The next theorem gives an additional characterization of the value v (s). In the statement of the theorem
we will use the following notation: suppose the game is in the state s, C1 plays a
1, C2 plays a
2 and R plays
the (predetermined) move σ3 (s); then we denote the next game state by T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
))
. We have the
following.
Theorem 4.5 Given some graph G = (V,E), suppose SCPR is played on G and the robber is controlled by an
oblivious deterministic strategy σ3. Then, ∀s ∈ Sa, we have
v (s) = max
a1
min
a2
[
q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))]
= min
a2
max
a1
[
q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))]
. (22)
Proof. Since σ3 is deterministic, Pr
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
))
|s, a1, a2
)
= 1. Hence, by [13, Theorem 4.4.3]:
v (s) = Val
[
q (s) +
∑
s′∈S
Pr (s′|s, a1, a2) v (s
′)
]
= Val
[
q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))]
.
Since σ∗1 and σ
∗
2 are also deterministic, at every turn of the game they produce an action with probability one.
Hence there exist actions a1 = σ∗1 (s), a
2 = σ∗2 (s) such that
v (s) = q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
.
Since, from Theorem 4.4, v (s) ∈ {0, 1}, we consider two cases.
1. Suppose v (s) = 1. This means, that starting at s, C1 will certainly capture R.
(a) If s is a C1-capture state, then q (s) = 1 and, for any actions a
1, a2, T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
))
= τ , in
which case
v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
= v (τ) = 0.
Hence v (s)= maxa1 mina2
[
q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))]
= 1.
(b) If s is not a C1-capture state, then q (s) = 0 and v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 1. Suppose there existed
some â2 such that v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, â2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 0. This would mean that, starting at T̂
(
s,
(
a1, â2, σ3 (s)
))
,
C2 would certainly capture R before C1 and, since a
1 is the optimal (fastest capturing) move for C1,
we would also have
∀a1 ∈ A1 (s) : q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, â2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 0.
But then v (s) = Val
[
q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))]
= 0, contrary to the assumption. So we must
instead have
∀a2 ∈ A2 (s) : q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 1
which implies v (s)= maxa1 mina2
[
q (s) + v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))]
= 1.
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2. Now suppose v (s) = 0. Then s is not a C1-capture state, i.e., q (s) = 0. Now, we will show that
∀a1 ∈ A1 (s) : ∃a
2 ∈ A2 (s) : v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 0. (23)
If this is not the case, then we must have
∃a˜1 ∈ A1 (s) : ∀a
2 ∈ A2 (s) : v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a˜1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 1.
Then C1 will certainly capture R (before C2) starting from the game position T
(
s,
(
a˜1, a2, σ3 (s)
))
and
this will be true for any a2 ∈ A2 (s). But this means that C1, starting from game position s and playing
a˜1, will certainly capture R before C2; which in turn means v (s) = 1, contrary to the hypothesis. Hence
(23) holds and this implies
∀a1 ∈ A1 (s) : min
a2
v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 0
⇒ max
a1
min
a2
v
(
T̂
(
s,
(
a1, a2, σ3 (s)
)))
= 0.
Hence we have proved the first part of (22). The proof of the second part is similar and omitted.
Remark 4.6 It must be emphasized that Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 4.5 do not hold for deterministic non-
oblivious strategies σ3. This can be seen by the following counterexample. Suppose that concurrent SCPR is
played on the graph of Figure 1, starting from the state (2, 6, 1).
1
2 3 4 5 6
Figure 1: An example where deterministic robber strategy results in randomized optimal cop strategies.
Furthermore, the robber is controlled by the σ3 which is (partially) described in the following table.(
x1t , x
2
t , x
3
t
)
x3t+1 = σ3
(
x1t , x
2
t , x
3
t
)
(2, 6, 1) 4
(2, 6, 4) 3
(2, 5, 4) 5
(3, 6, 4) 5
(3, 5, 4) 3
Table 1: A part of the robber strategy σ3
For every game state not listed above the robber stays in place, i.e., x3t+1 = σ3
(
x1t , x
2
t , x
3
t
)
= x3t . Now consider
what the first moves of C1 and C2 should be. They know that R will move into vertex 4; C1 can either stay at
2 or move into 3; C2 can either stay at 6 or move into 5. After the first move is completed, the possible game
states are the following.
s0 = (2, 6, 1) a
1
1 = 2 a
2
1 = 6 a
3
1 = σ3 (2, 6, 1) = 4 s1 = (2, 6, 4)
s0 = (2, 6, 1) a
1
1 = 2 a
2
1 = 5 a
3
1 = σ3 (2, 6, 1) = 4 s1 = (2, 5, 4)
s0 = (2, 6, 1) a
1
1 = 3 a
2
1 = 6 a
3
1 = σ3 (2, 6, 1) = 4 s1 = (3, 6, 4)
s0 = (2, 6, 1) a
1
1 = 3 a
2
1 = 5 a
3
1 = σ3 (2, 6, 1) = 4 s1 = (3, 5, 4)
Table 2: Possible states at the end of the first turn.
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It is easy to check (from the respective σ3 values) that for s1 = (2, 6, 4) and s1 = (3, 5, 4) the capturing cop is
C1, while for s1 = (2, 5, 4) and s1 = (3, 6, 4) the capturing cop is C2. Hence the game can be written out as the
following (one-turn) matrix game
a2 = 6 a2 = 5
a1 = 2 1 0
a1 = 3 0 1
Table 3: The one-turn matrix game equivalent to the original stochastoc game.
It is easy to compute, using standard methods, that the optimal strategies for this game. C1 must use
Pr
(
a1 = 2
)
= Pr
(
a1 = 3
)
= 12 and C2 must use Pr
(
a2 = 6
)
= Pr
(
a2 = 5
)
= 12 . This implies that the op-
timal strategies σ∗1 and σ
∗
2 are randomized, despite the fact that σ3 is deterministic (but not oblivious). Many
similar examples can be constructed. The important point is this: when σ3 is not oblivious, C1 (resp. C2) moves
can influence future R moves and (since moves are performed simultaneously) this influence cannot be predicted
by C2 (resp. C1).
5 Related Work
In this section we present work which is related to both the SCPR and other variants of the CR game.
We have already mentioned that the interested reader can find useful references to the CR literature in the
book [20] by Nowakowski and Bonato. The CR literature is mainly oriented to graph theoretic and combinatorial
considerations. Indeed CR can be seen as a combinatorial game. On the topic of combinatorial games, the reader
can consult the introductory text [1] as well as the classic book (in four volumes) [5] by Berlekamp and Conway.
We also find interesting combinatorial generalizations of the CR game in the papers [7, 8] by A. Bonato and G.
MacGillivray.
We believe that “classic” game theory offers a natural (but not often used in the “mainstream” CR literature)
framework for the analysis of CR games. In particular, as already seen, we consider SCPR as a stochastic game.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [23]. A classic book on the subject is [13], which also contains a
rich bibliography; see also [18].
A type of stochastic games which are especially related to CR games are recursive games, in which whenever
a non-zero-payoff is received the play immediately moves to an absorbing state. Recursive games were introduced
by Everett [12]. It is obvious that SCPR is a recursive game; while we have not used results from the recursive
game theory in the current paper, we believe this may turn out to be a fruitful connection.
Let us now mention a construction which has been used in several “classic” CR papers [7, 8, 14]. Suppose
that a “classic” CR game is played between one cop and one robber on the undirected graph G = (V,E). We
now construct the game digraph D = (S,A), where the vertex set is S = V ×V ×{1, 2} and the arc set A encodes
possible vertex-to-vertex transitions. Then a play of the CR game can be understood as a walk on D; the cop
wins if he can force the walk to pass through a vertex of the form (x, x, i). Hence CR can be seen as a game in
which the two players push a token along the arcs of the digraph. As pointed out in [7, 8] many CR variants
and several other pursuit games on graphs (including the concurrent CR game) can be formulated in a similar
manner.
It turns out that such “digraph games” have been studied by several researchers and the related literature is
spread among many communities. The earliest such works of which we are aware is [4, 16]. Other early examples
of this iterature are the papers [3, 11, 24]. But probably the most widespread application of this point of view
is in the literature of reachability games [6] and, more generally, ω-regular games [17]. In a reachability game
two players take turns moving a token along the arcs of a digraph; player 1 wants to place the token on one of
the nodes of a subset of the digraph vertices while player 2 wants to avoid this event. In addition to “classic”
sequential rechability games, many other variants have been studied, e.g., stochastic [9], concurrent [2], n-player
[10] etc. The connection to CR games is obvious; it seems likely that the voluminous literature on reachability
games contains results of interest to CR researchers.
11
6 Conclusion
We have introduced the game of selfish cops and passive robber (SCPR game) and established its basic properties,
namely the existence of value and optimal strategies for both the sequential and concurrent variants; we have
also provided algorithms for the computation of the aforementioned quantities. In the current paper we have
examined qualitative variants of the game, i.e., these in which the goal of the cops is simply to capture the
robber. In a forthcoming paper we will examine quantitative variants, in which the goal is to capture the robber
in the shortest possible time.
Several additional issues merit further study and will be the subject of our future research. We have formulated
SCPR as a zero-sum game; but reasonable formulations as a non-zero-sum game are also possible and we
conjecture that these may lead to qualitatively different results. In addition, if we remove the assumption that
the robber is passive and deal instead with the situation of two selfish robbers and a robber actively trying to
avoid capture, we are left with a three-player game, which we intend to study in the future.
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